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Is there still a role for discourse research today? A decade ago French actor-network 
theorist Bruno Latour famously declared the end of critique as ethos and practice in 
the social sciences. Empirical work therefore should be replaced by a politics of 
‘matters of concern’. French sociologist Luc Boltanski added to this critique of critical 
perspectives by suggesting that an investigation into social modes of critique should 
replace critical sociology. Against this background, and with a focus on discourse 
research, the present contribution stresses the ongoing need for precise empirical 
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1. Introduction 
More than a decade ago French actor-network theory pioneer Bruno Latour declared 
the end of critique in social constructivism and discourse research. According to 
Latour, critique had lost its power and did not reveal anything anymore to anyone and 
therefore should be replaced by an engagement with transforming matters of fact into 
matters of concern. In parallel, French sociologist Luc Boltanski argued for a 
sociology of critical capacities and critique instead of critical sociology. He thereby 
tried to establish a route from the analysis of social critique toward critical sociological 
interventions. The following paper begins by introducing the current field of discourse 
research as one of the areas under attack by Latour and Boltanski (2). It then 
discusses Latour’s (3) and Boltanski’s (4) arguments, pointing out a number of 
problems inherent in their positions. In contrast to their move away from constructivist 
empirical research it argues for the ongoing value of precise empirical discourse 
research and social constructivism in establishing matters of concern, therefore 
drawing on different ways of performing research into the social relationships of 
knowledge and the politics of knowledge (5).  
 
2. The multiplicity of current discourse research 
It is not easy to talk in general about discourse research and discourse analysis for 
the reason that these terms refer to a broad range of approaches with rather different 
interests and concepts. Discourse research today is a well-established, 
                                        
1 I would like to express my thanks to Adele Clarke for her helpful suggestions. 
4 
 
heterogeneous and interdisciplinary field of inquiry investigating social language use 
and discursive constructions of reality (Keller, 2013). It extends from perspectives 
embedded in linguistics to cultural studies and the social sciences, including 
education, political science and sociology. Linguistic discourse research is interested 
in language, its rules, transformations and social functions. Other discourse research 
in the humanities and the social sciences tends towards questions of power and 
world-making. Some approaches, situated between linguistics and the social 
sciences, explicitly claim to be ‘critical’ – especially Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA; 
Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Wodak & Meyer, 2001) and the Essex School of 
Hegemonics (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000). The principal aim of CDA is to 
unmask the ideological or discriminatory use of language in the mass media, in 
everyday conversation, office talk or political arenas. For example, a politician 
speaking ‘in the name of the people’ might be ‘revealed’ as ‘speaking in the name of 
the ruling capitalist class’ or ‘the hidden agenda of neoliberalism’. Using a specific 
word in a debate or mass media contribution might be labeled and problematized as 
‘racist’ or ‘fascist’. Office talk might be shown as structured by informal powers and 
therefore ‘asymmetric’. ‘Unmasking’ hidden agendas behind surface discourse is a 
version of the hermeneutics of suspicion, a term coined by Paul Ricœur (1970). 
Classical examples are Marxist hermeneutics (where the given is the effect of capital 
power) or Freudian hermeneutics (in which current behavior and talk is understood 
as the effect of ‘unresolved’ early childhood constellations).2 
The project of the Essex School of Hegemonics (ESH) is also close to such a 
hermeneutics. It builds on Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Saussurian linguistics, as well as Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Rooted in the study of populist social movements and labor 
                                        
2 For a comprehensive critique of CDA see Widdowson (2004). 
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relations, it conceives of discourses “as relational and differential configurations of 
elements” (Howarth & Griggs, 2012, p. 308), which are the result of ongoing 
articulatory practice. In assuming the fundamental incompleteness of discursive 
structures, the Hegemonics school emphasizes the role of subjects in producing 
novel articulations. The notions of “hegemony” and “empty signifier” are introduced to 
account for the partial fixing of meanings in an otherwise contingent flow of 
articulations. Empty signifiers are conceptualized as discursive elements which can 
serve as a kind of umbrella term for coalitions composed of divergent actors and thus 
can provide some sort of unity to the discourse. ESH scholars study established 
“organic or inorganic hegemonies” and emerging “counter-hegemonies” in order to 
“critically explain why and how one particular policy has been formulated, accepted, 
and implemented, rather than others” (Howarth & Griggs, 2012, p. 309). It mobilizes 
psychoanalytic categories to explain affective dimensions of policy change: How and 
why – or why not – are subjects drawn into a discourse? What role is played by 
subjective desire and attachment? Here, according to Howarth and Griggs (who draw 
upon Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek), a “logic of fantasy” is at work, which explains 
the “enjoyment subjects procure from their identifications with certain signifiers and 
figures” (Howard & Griggs, 2012, p. 322). The Essex School indeed re-introduces, 
via Lacanian psychoanalysis, a narrow ontology of the subject and its emotional 
economy shaped by the lack of idealized completeness and the desire to remedy this 
lack as core explanatory factors.3 
                                        
3 The origin of this conception of the subject lies in Laclau’s research on reactionary right wing 
populism and provides a rationale for the identification with such nationalist positions. There is a long 
tradition dating back to the 1930s in Critical Theory of using psychoanalytical theories to explain the 
vote for the extreme right. However, I doubt that it can be transferred to emancipatory social 
movements and discourse in general: What is the element of lack when arguing for climate action? 
And given the conditions of this absence, why does it choose identification with right wing populism, 
and not with dream escape literature? This is not to deny that desire and passion are important 
elements in political and societal engagements. 
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Other streams of discourse analysis, found mostly in corpus-linguistics, but also in 
some versions of frame analysis as used in social movement research,4 prefer a 
more positivist approach, statistically describing such features as co-occurrences of 
words and semantic patterns of language use in big data. They thereby attempt to 
account for changes in word/concept/frame usage in public discourse across 
decades and between arenas and actors.5  
Yet other streams, such as Foucauldian-based work, including the Sociology of 
Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD), which is explored in more detail below 
(see Keller, 2011a, b), do not explicitly refer to critique, but make use of the 
Foucauldian philosophical concept of ‘critique’ discussed in some of his famous 
writings (Foucault, 1984; 2007). Here, critique in a loosely Kantian tradition is 
conceived as an implicit strategy involving the reconstruction of conditions of 
possibility for the presence of phenomena and, I would add, thereby also conditions 
of impossibility. These might include the contingent realities of the modern subject 
being responsible, sane, healthy, rule following, with correct sexual practices 
(Foucault, 2000a, 2000b). 
However, neither the explicit labeling of an approach – in discourse research and 
beyond – as ‘critical’, nor the most honest critical intentions of a researcher, is a 
guarantee of the critical functions or effects of a specific concrete analysis. Such 
labeling might even do the opposite by providing knowledge for established powers 
and domination.6 On the other hand, research which is not labeled ‘critical’ might 
have far reaching critical effects. There is considerable evidence for this. Take, for 
                                        
4 For a critique of the latter see Ulrich & Keller (2014). 
5 See Benford & Snow (2000) on frame analysis; for a content analysis of abortion discourse as frame 
analysis see Gamson et. al. (2002). For corpus-linguistics see Conrad (2002). 
6 E.g., when Judith Butler (1997) tries to identify the subject‘s core elements of resistance inside of its 
psychostructure (drawing on psychoanalysis) she runs the risk, if she succeeded, of providing new 
tools for manipulation. 
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example, Michel Foucault’s work on The History of Madness (Foucault, 2009), Erving 
Goffman’s study on the inner life of psychiatry in Asylums (Goffman, 1961), or 
Howard S. Becker’s famous writings on Outsiders (Becker, 1997). ‘Critique’ in 
general, and in discourse research too, therefore seems to be a very complex notion. 
 
3. From matters of fact to matters of concern: Bruno Latour and critique 
3.1. Beyond critique? 
According to a prominent statement deriving from a conference at Stanford University 
in 2003 and published by French anthropologist Bruno Latour some years ago, 
“critique has run out of steam” (Latour, 2004a). In that paper, Latour starts by 
observing climate skepticism. He quotes an editorial in the New York Times: 
Most scientists believe that [global] warming is caused largely by man-made 
pollutants that require strict regulation. Mr. Luntz [a Republican strategist] 
seems to acknowledge as much when he says that ‘the scientific debate is 
closing against us.’ His advice, however, is to emphasize that the evidence is 
not complete. ‘Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are 
settled,’ he writes, ‘their views about global warming will change accordingly. 
Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a 
primary issue’.7 
Latour’s argument is as follows: In a world in which the experience of and arguments 
for contingency have become basic features of everyday life, social scientific 
‘unmasking’ of ‘essentialism’ and ‘hidden agendas’ – such as via social constructivist 
                                        
7 “Environmental Word Games,” New York Times, 15. Mar. 2003, p. A16, quoted in Latour, 2004a, p. 
226. The NYT article is available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/15/opinion/environmental-word-
games.html [accessed January 29, 2016). 
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and historical analysis or social theory – has ceased to be a viable course of action. 
Why? Because today everybody knows about contingency, and the work of 
‘unmasking’ is very popular throughout society. Thus, since everybody does it, the 
special impact of the social sciences’ critical work no longer generates worthwhile 
effects: 
What has become of critique when DARPA uses for its Total Information 
Awareness project the Baconian slogan Scientia est potentia? Didn’t I read that 
somewhere in Michel Foucault? Has knowledge-slash-power been co-opted of 
late by the National Security Agency? Has Discipline and Punish become the 
bedtime reading of Mr. Ridge [...]? (Latour, 2004a, p. 228)8 
In academia, science and technology studies established the fact of the social 
shaping of scientific knowledge, and a large range of constructivist research (e.g., 
Hacking, 2000) accounted for the historical contingencies of social phenomena. 
According to Latour, such approaches today fail simply because of their past success 
– everyone, everywhere now knows about contingency.  
In order to ‘save the critical spirit’, he suggests throughout his essay that as social 
scientists we should instead try our hand at turning “matters of fact” into “matters of 
concern” (Latour, 2004a). This position, taken up by one of the world’s most 
prominent scholars in the social sciences no less, tears deeply into the heart of 
discourse research and into many other realms of social research and theory as well. 
Regardless of the different stances in this field, Latour directly challenges them all. 
He suggests first that there is no further need for sociological and discourse 
approaches labeled as ‘critical’, since everyone already knows the facts of power and 
domination. Thus, there is nothing more to unmask. No one will listen to such things 
                                        
8 DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, US Department of Defense. 
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anymore. Second, by including as targets the genealogical and reconstructive 
approaches of Foucauldian work and social constructivism in discourse research, 
Latour expresses not only a deep contempt towards time consuming but precise 
empirical work linked to an urge for political action, but also devalues the role such 
work plays in generating public awareness of contingency and possibility. Latour’s 
two main arguments will be considered more closely in the following. 
 
3.2. Everyone knows? Latour against ‘social constructionism’ 
Latour begins by making an argument against the kind of genealogical work 
established by Michel Foucault in his studies on the history of madness, the medical 
gaze, discipline and punishment, and sexualities. Genealogy in Foucault, an idea 
closely linked and influenced by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (e.g., 
On the Genealogy of Morality, 1887), traces historical contingencies, discontinuities 
and transformations of power/knowledge-constellations which can be identified as 
regimes of power-knowledge through time. The analysis is about “games of power” 
and “games of truth”, about conflict, struggle, domination, historical ontology and 
historical becoming, without assuring pathways to brighter futures and the ultimate 
progress of knowledge making or even Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Genealogy, 
according to Foucault, is a never-ending story throughout the social history of 
power/knowledge-regimes. 
But according to Latour, analyzing the complex historical becoming of such 
constellations of power, dispositifs9 and orders of discourse and knowledge no longer 
seems valuable. He argues that ‘social construction’, which, beyond Foucault and to 
                                        




a lesser historical degree, is the core argument of some branches of social 
constructionism (e.g. Hacking 2000 and in a different sense, Berger & Luckmann, 
1966), is outdated. Why? Because knowing about the historical contingency of 
everything – our political system, scientific facts, norms and values in everyday life, 
life forms, etc. – has become, at least according to Latour, part of common sense, 
used in everyday affairs to generate critique of all kind of issues, including the facts of 
climate change. Everyone already knows that our innovations are naturalized and 
hence devalued. The role model for such critique is conspiracy theory (i.e., ‘the twin 
towers were destroyed by the CIA’; ‘the moon landing was a fake’), which works just 
as effectively in popular culture as in critical social science (Latour, 2004a, p. 229). 
This polemic leads Latour directly to his attack on the second version of critique, that 
inspired by pre-established social theory. Latour refers here to the work of French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu or, to be more precise, to an effect of a “too quick 
reading” (Latour, 2004a, p. 229) of Bourdieu’s work, as he argues with caution. 
Shorthand Bourdieusianism also implies strong affinities with ‘conspiracy theory’ as 
practiced in everyday life. But this time it is performed in social theory: 
[…] you have to learn to become suspicious of everything people say because of 
course we all know that they live in the thralls of a complete illusio of their real 
motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an explanation is requested for what 
is really going on, in both cases again it is the same appeal to powerful agents 
hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of course, 
we in the academy like to use more elevated causes – society, discourse, 
knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism – while conspiracists 
like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intent, but I find 
something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in the first 
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movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal explanations coming 
out of the deep dark below. What if explanations resorting automatically to power, 
society, discourse had outlived their usefulness and deteriorated to the point of 
now feeding the most gullible sort of critique? (Latour, 2004a, pp. 229-230) 
One might ask whether Latour’s referring to ‘theory’ in both conspiracy theory and 
social theory here is not a strange case of blurring genres and words. Next, in the 
following, Latour (2004a, pp. 237-239) accounts for two main explanatory, or perhaps 
clearer, revelatory strategies of such ‘critiques by theory’. First, the so-called “fairy 
position” states that the world as perceived is nothing but a projection. If you think 
elites and gods are powerful, indeed it is you yourselves, the people who via 
projection create and allow the power of elites and gods! The second argument – the 
“fact position” – can be summed up as follows: You, the everyday woman or man in 
the street, think you know the world as it is. But you are wrong, because you are a 
prisoner of illusio, of the secret structural forces which are working under the surface 
of reality, called habitus and field, called discourse, class, intersectionality or 
neoliberalism, or whatever other concepts have been invented in social theory. 
Both of these stances allow – please remember, according to Bruno Latour – for the 
critical social scientist to occupy a superior and extremely comfortable position, 
perhaps not quite godlike, as Donna Haraway (1988) would have put it, but 
somewhere ‘above’ the others. Further, we must remember here that Pierre Bourdieu 
(1991, 2007) conceived his sociological diagnostics as “socio-analysis”, explicitly 
referencing psychoanalysis and thereby claiming a grasp of the process of revealing, 
via his sociology, the secret forces which drive our collective life.10 Socio-analysis, by 
                                        
10 The argumentative strategy of philosophical and normative critique as established in the Frankfurt 
School of Critical Theory tradition is somehow different. Regardless of the internal differences, it tries 
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the way, is superior to every other position taken in academic research because it not 
only breaks, via its epistemology with everyday doxa and native-naive sociology, but 
with naive social science too! Only Bourdieusian theory is able to objectify social 
scientific objectivization and place itself in a third order observer position above the 
fracas (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]). 
To sociologists who reserve the term ‘social constructionism’ for particular 
approaches, such as that of Berger and Luckmann (1966), the line Latour draws 
between social constructivism and critical sociology is striking. Moreover, in a related 
paper on the “promises of constructivism”, Latour (2003) explains, that “everything is 
wrong with constructivism”, although it seemed – even to him! – a very good idea at 
the beginning.11 First, it is wrong because it explains too much solidity by the effects 
of the “social”. Here again, Bourdieu’s sociology in particular and critical sociology in 
general are cases in point for attack (and theories of de-construction too). Second, it 
is wrong because it suggests a master (plan) of construction. Third, it is wrong 
because it lacks a concept of materiality. And furthermore it is wrong because of its 
ubiquitous use throughout the humanities (see Hacking, 2000). 
3.3. Matters of concern – Towards a renewed ethics of discourse? 
Against the simply ‘good feeling of being a critical mind’ (Latour, 2004a, p. 238)12 and 
the “euphoric drug of critique” (Latour, 2004a, p. 239), and against the general misery 
of critique he feels, Latour then claims a strong realism. 
                                                                                                                           
to reach the external eye’s position via philosophical reflection and philosophically established 
indisputable normative grounds, not via social theory, empirical research and ‘proof’. 
11 In 2014 he states that „social construction“ is nothing but an “ersatz of mind“, a concept we should 
not “stick to“ (Latour, 2014, Lecture 2, p. 28). 
12 “Do you see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind?“ (Latour, 2004a, p. 238)  
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What I am going to argue is that the critical mind, if it is to renew itself and be 
relevant again, is to be found in the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude – to 
speak like William James – but a realism dealing with what I will call matters of 
concern, not matters of fact. (Latour, 2004a, p. 231) 
But, you may well ask, how does Latour intend to save critique? Referring to the 
linguistic and philosophical etymology of the word ‘thing’, Latour proposes to 
conceive of things – like facts, objects, and we may add: institutions, organizations, 
discourses – as ‘associations’ or ‘assemblages’ of different elements, that is as fora 
or agendas, as compositions to involve all kind of concerned actants: 
[…] Give me one matter of concern and I will show you the whole earth and 
heavens that have to be gathered to hold it firmly in place […] The critic is not the 
one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts 
the rugs from under the feet of the naı̈ve believers, but the one who offers the 
participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one who alternates 
haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn 
by Goya, but the one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is 
fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. I am aware that to get at the 
heart of this argument one would have to renew also what it means to be a 
constructivist, but I have said enough to indicate the direction of critique, not away 
but toward the gathering, the Thing. The practical problem we face, if we try to go 
that new route, is to associate the word criticism with a whole set of new positive 
metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee-jerk reactions, habits of thoughts. (Latour, 
2004a, p. 246) 
It seems that Latour’s sketch for new democratic institutions as presented in the very 
same year to the English speaking public in Politics of Nature (Latour, 2004b), 
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delivers a kind of role model for a new political sphere in which such matters of 
concern can be dealt with. In this book, Latour presents a general template for a “new 
constitution”, introducing the “parliament of things”, an institutional device that is used 
to represent, discuss, evaluate and judge such matters of concern.  
Ten years later, in 2014, he writes about “situations” he has arranged, in which 
differing claims of reality descriptions meet, demonstrating that there is a pluriverse 
rather than a universe (Latour, 2014, Lecture One, pp. 17-19). But we might well ask: 
Doesn’t this somehow end up as a recycled ethics of discourse similar to that 
established in the early 1980s by German Philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1984, 
1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1996)? A reminder: Discourse ethics was presented as a 
contra-factual idea, as an organizing device and setting for conflict resolution, to 
clarify distinctions between ‘factual truth’ and normative rules, especially in the 
context of public deliberations and environmental concerns. Based on a universal 
pragmatics of language use, Habermas distinguished between factual, normative and 
expressive statements. Factual statements refer to the ‘objective world’ and its 
materiality out there. Normative statements are about the value and justification of 
social norms. Expressive statements are about inner-personal states of mind (like 
feelings). According to Habermas, a practical discourse is a concrete, situated, 
institutional device and setting focused around an issue of concern – e.g., a planned 
waste treatment infrastructure, a new technology with far reaching consequences like 
GMO or nanotechnologies – in which all the concerned parties assemble, having the 
same rights to speak and argue their case along the three dimensions of language 
use.13 
                                        
13 Such institutional devices have been established since the early 1990s as ‘round tables‘, ‘consensus 
conferences‘ or ‘conflict mediation on environmental and technological issues‘ in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and other countries. Habermas‘ work has been a major background to this 
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Is this what Latour is reincarnating? Social actors, representing divergent interests 
and facts, assembled around a table, arguing about the evaluation of factual claims? 
Deciding, in a setting ‘free of domination’, upon ‘hierarchies of concerns’? And the 
better argument wins? To me, it appears close to this, despite the long detour Latour 
traveled through the science studies. But wasn’t Habermas even more concrete, 
providing a rationale for discussion, whereas Latour stops at the very idea of bringing 
different people and interests together, simply bypassing the question of how to 
decide, for example, on red tuna vs. the Japanese (Latour, 2010)? And if not, what 
would a mix of Habermas and Latour look like today? 
3.4 The need for evaluating matters of concern 
Certainly there are advantages in such settings. Nevertheless, as Keller & Poferl 
(2000) argued, the basic problem is the contra-factuality of the setting itself. In order 
to function, it implies an equal access to knowledge, its resources and production, the 
capacity to ‘make’ evidence and so forth. SKAD argues that social sciences 
discourse research is about the discursive construction of reality, that is, social 
relationships of knowledge and politics of knowledge (Keller 2011a, b). The former 
refers to the idea that societies establish hierarchies of truth, moral order and 
institutional claims to reality. The latter refers to competing actors engaged in 
discursive struggles on the “definition of the situation” (William I. Thomas & Dorothy 
Thomas). Social relationships of knowledge are asymmetric relationships of power. 
Material and symbolic resources for politics of knowledge are anything but equally 
distributed throughout society. So the idealized setting proposed by Habermas, 
viewed from a Foucauldian angle, simply ignores the complex hierarchies existing in 
                                                                                                                           
phenomenon. The balance sheets so far indicate a gap between such deliberate discourse and 
institutional or political consequences (Feindt & Saretzki 2010). 
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all power/knowledge-regimes. Nor does Latour tell us how to deal with competing 
claims or concerns in such a parliament or situation. So is his suggestion only about 
introducing more issues and actors into established playgrounds of political powers?  
Recently, Puig de la Bellacasa has pointed out as well the lack of criteria in Latour’s 
position concerning how to proceed in such settings. Picking up on one of his cases 
in point, a conflict between a ‘hardcore’ ecologist and SUV drivers, she resumes his 
argument against the ‘fundamentalist ecologist’ who is advised to respect and attend 
to the interests of the SUV owners. Puig de la Bellacasa therefore asks: “[...] do we 
not still need critical approaches to play a role in the assembling of concern?” (2011, 
p. 89) She further states: 
My problem here is with how the problem is presented, and how the argument 
for care is mobilized to protect the SUV issue from its objectification by a critical 
participant – an angry and fairly disrespectful environmentalist. Respect for 
concerns and the call for care become arguments to moderate a critical 
standpoint. (2011, p. 91) 
Drawing on Donna Haraway’s and other feminist work, Puig de la Bellacasa (2011, 
2012) argues for an “ethos of engaging with care”, for a “speculative commitment to 
neglected things” and “matters of care” as additional principles necessary to address 
such situations.14 Such an ethos introduces a critical rationale for evaluation into the 
realm of “matters of concern” and fully acknowledges that not all stakeholder 
positions can be considered equal in the way conceived by Bruno Latour. 
My own argument, presented next, raises yet another objection which in principle 
goes along with Puig de la Bellacasa. I explicitly refer to the ongoing importance of 
                                        
14 For an extended discussion of the role of care in knowledge politics and social studies of science 
and technology, see Martin, Myers & Visieu (2015). 
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empirical analysis and of genealogical and reconstructive discourse research in order 
to make visible the asymmetric relationships of knowledge and the work of 
knowledge politics implied in such ‘arguing cases’. Mere claims of critique are not 
enough. 
 
4. Sociology of critique instead of critical sociology? 
4.1. Moral orders and critique 
Before we return to Latour, another (and also French) approach to revitalizing critique 
will be addressed which seeks to replace critical theories (e.g., the Frankfurt School) 
and critical sociologies (e.g., Bourdieu’s) with a sociology of critical capacities. This 
refers to the work of French sociologist Luc Boltanski and French economist Laurent 
Thévenot (see Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2006) on the moral orders of 
judgment/”economies of worth” and their analysis of critique in social life. As will be 
argued, Boltanski and Thévenot point to very interesting issues for contemporary 
discourse research but without exploring their full potential. And unfortunately, 
Boltanski (2011) also fails to transform the analysis of critical capacities into a new 
haven for critical sociology. 
For Luc Boltanski too, Pierre Bourdieu is the main enemy – French academia is a 
small world. After his theoretical and personal split with Bourdieu in the 1980s, 
Boltanski advanced arguments for sociological inquiry into the processes and 
procedures of critique in everyday life, into how common people as well as 
organizations make, establish, defend and evaluate critical arguments and 
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interventions. Let me sum up the basic arguments.15 Boltanski and Thévenot argue 
that throughout its history, French society has established several economies of 
worth, that is hierarchies of evaluation to decide upon the ‘worth’ of a person, 
organization, practice or object. For example, the economy of inspiration in the field 
of the arts places very high value on the creative individual, and much less on one 
who merely copies what others have done. The economy of the home, the domestic 
world, creates hierarchy in processes of belonging. One should note that the 
identified orders (or ‘worlds’) here are not causally linked to a special field of practice.  
4.2. The critical work common people do 
In the everyday lives of people and organizations, such orders of worth are used in 
situations everywhere, much like a grammatical system, to evaluate and judge 
situations, objects, phenomena, and people. They are also used to present critique, 
such as addressing the question whether some order has been correctly applied, or 
whether the present order of evaluation should be replaced by another. For example, 
in universities, grades given in oral exams or for reports are indicators of concrete 
work done by some person. They evaluate the contribution to science. But there are 
(and always have been) disputes regarding the form and quality of evaluation. Do 
grades evaluate what they should evaluate (intellectual contributions)? Or do they 
evaluate in relation to social attributes and identities (such as ethnicity, race, class, 
gender), which should not matter? Could evaluation processes be improved? Should 
they be replaced? What procedures of evaluation would then be the best to account 
for the capacity (such as ‘intellectual contribution’) one is seeking in a particular 
situation? 
                                        
15 I cannot account for their whole theory of six (as in the original book) or seven or eight (if newer 
work is included) moral orders established in French history and culture (please see the cited works of 
Boltanski & Thevenot). 
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Significantly, this is not presented as some kind of self-sufficient endeavor. Rather, 
by insisting on the critical capacities of everyday people, Boltanski (2011) argues that 
they understand their own situations quite well.16 There is no need for critical social 
theorists, placed in privileged observer positions ‘outside the game’, to explain to 
them their alienation due to structures of power and dominance. Viewed from this 
angle too, critical sociology and critical thinking in general have run out of steam. 
4.3. Problems of the sociology of critical capacities 
Several arguments have been made against Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s framework. 
Leading German critical theorist Axel Honneth (2008) wondered why so many 
classical French philosophers were dominant in the presentation of economies of 
worth. He was also surprised at their small number – why should there be only six 
such economies? Further, given that Boltanski and Thevenot basically argue with 
French philosophy and empirical research, is their theoretical elaboration and 
empirical account valuable for other societies beyond France? French sociologist 
Francis Chateauraynaud (2003) further objected to the rather proof-oriented empirical 
research ethos present in Boltanski and Thévenot. According to him they were, at 
least for large parts of their empirical work, not interested in empirical analysis and 
new results, but only in demonstration of the value of established concepts – theory 
testing rather than empirical research.17 
Nevertheless, Boltanski (2011) wants to explore, via his sociological analysis, the 
path which leads from everyday critique to an immanent critique of societies. Can a 
                                        
16 Please note that Latour and Boltanski, despite working in different fields and paradigms, share (or 
have shared) a longtime friendship and common discussion. Thus the affinities between their 
arguments may well not be by chance. Important differences regarding basic features of their 
sociologies exist too (see Latour 2004c). 
17 In fairness, one should add that at least Boltanski and Chiapello (2007 [1999]) show, via discourse 
analysis of management literature, the emergence of a new economy of worth. 
20 
 
new critical sociology be established on those solid grounds of immanent critique? 
Can it be grounded in the auto-critical capacity of societies or social collectivities? 
This is how Boltanski aims both to avoid an external god / observer position (which 
Bourdieu held) as well as the classical critical theory position which grounds its 
observations in philosophical reflections (or imaginations) of un-alienated life. 
However, a closer examination of Boltanski’s texts reveals that, despite arguing 
convincingly about the conditions of the emergence of critique in social worlds 
themselves, such as the eternal gap between collective institutions and human self-
interested role players, he fails to relate the sociological analysis of critique to 
sociological assistance to ‘the people’ to achieve their emancipation. As a true 
French thinker, he is not interested in ‘voice’ or ‘action research’. Rather, he seeks to 
assist the more or less ignorant everyday people in their fight for a new world by 
attacking in a rather simple manner the greedy deeds of powerful men governing the 
world. Moreover, he does not hesitate to point ultimately towards “revolution” as the 
goal. Thus, in his later days, despite rhetorical distanciation, Boltanski (2011), in fact 
and in words, re-joins his former colleague Pierre Bourdieu in mounting polemics 
against ‘the ruling classes’ and ‘the system’ – a position particularly difficult to ground 
in the theoretical diagnostics of economies of worth. 
 
5. Back to genealogy and interpretative analytics of power/knowledge as 
(possible) catalysts for critique 
5.1. Interpretative analytics and critical effects 
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By now you may consider the author of this paper a rather old-fashioned European 
sociologist struggling with conceptual ghosts from yesteryear. But please allow me in 
my conclusion to sum up my arguments against the positions presented. 
First, I wish to emphasize the possibility and capability of emerging critical effects of 
all kinds of solid sociological research and arguments which help to expand the 
“action repertoire of societies”, as German sociologist Hans-Georg Soeffner put it in 
an interview (see Reichertz, 2004). ‘Solid’ here does not refer to some positivist ideal 
of science, but, as the endless ideological and rhetorical work of simplification 
abounds in the public domain, to carefully executed theoretical and empirical work 
which engages with the complexities of today’s social agendas (see Clarke & Keller, 
2014) for “telling about society” (Becker, 2008).  
Significantly, this is not the exclusive jurisdiction of explicitly ‘critical’ approaches. And 
it holds not only for empirical analysis, but also for theory and diagnostics of a 
different kind, as the work of German sociologist Ulrich Beck (2008) has impressively 
demonstrated. For example, his ground-breaking arguments on risk society and 
individualization, based not on his own empirical research, but on informed 
sociological reading and ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills 2000 [1959]) pointed to 
inequalities of risk definition and risk exposures and very much changed public 
awareness and possibilities for (and even perhaps: realities of) action in 
contemporary societies. 
Second, to return to discourse research, I insist on the ongoing usefulness of 
genealogical inquiry and interpretative analytics regarding power/knowledge regimes. 
Such genealogical inquiry, according to Foucault, implies carefully conducted 
empirical research. Herein social phenomena are conceived as crystallized effects of 
complex constellations and historical becoming which cannot be explained using a 
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one-theory-fits-all rationale. They exist, in the words of Max Weber, as “historical 
individuals”. Therefore, they cannot be accounted for via simple cause-and-effect 
assumptions, but demand careful research into their always and ever particular 
features. The term “interpretative analytics” was coined by Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1983) to describe Foucault’s work and methodology. ‘Interpretation’ therein refers to 
the far reaching societal diagnostics proposed by Michel Foucault, as in concepts 
such as “disciplinary society”. ‘Analytics’ points to Foucault’s distancing from pre-
established theoretical explanations such as those of Karl Marx or Pierre Bourdieu 
(and perhaps we should add Bruno Latour and Luc Boltanski) which deductively 
account for social phenomena by the same assumptions regarding the always 
already-known ‘most important’ elements and relations. While SKAD uses this idea of 
analytics, it prefers a different connotation of ‘interpretation’, one anchored in the 
interpretive tradition of sociology (Keller, 2011, 2012). 
5.2. A never ending story: de-objectifying against simplification 
Societies are made up of competing worlds, hierarchies, structures of domination, 
hate and violence, but also of pleasure, community action, human care, and 
friendship. And the conflicts, issues, commitments and resources available for the 
definition of collective situations – including things, actors, animals, objects, values, 
ways of doing, justifications, etc. – never cease. Pretending that reality is the way it is 
and must be the way it is, surely is an ongoing business in which lots of sciences are 
active partners. Therefore discourse analytical reconstruction and genealogical 
analysis remain useful and timely tools with which to establish contingency. Latour’s 
‘solution’ of transforming “matters of fact” into “matters of concern” is like the white 
rabbit springing out of the magician’s hat – if it is not grounded in discourse, 
analytical reconstruction of implicated constellations, contingencies and silenced 
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actants, in the carefully done analysis of social relationships of knowledge and 
politics of knowledge – the realms of discursive construction of realities. How else 
could you, as a scientific worker, seriously be able to establish a “thing” as a matter 
of concern?18  
In working against processes of “objectification” and “reification” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, pp. 106-107), sociological and discourse analytical work helps ‘de-
objectify’ reality. Therefore, Latour’s core argument for saving critique is not an 
alternative to discourse research and social constructionism, but the direct outcome 
of such research. The effects of Foucauldian work are the most obvious arguments 
for such an evaluation. The ethos of enlightenment, according to Foucault (1984), 
implies never-ending effort. 
5.3. Discourse research as sociology of knowledge 
In order to do such research, sociology and the social sciences in general must 
reexamine the concept of discourse: Discourse is not language or language use. It is 
not only a framing of phenomena but, following Foucault, a heuristic device for 
exploring the making and unmaking of knowledge/power constellations. The 
sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD) therefore articulates 
Foucauldian work with Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge and 
pragmatist interpretive sociology. As Adele Clarke (2005) has argued, we are awash 
in seas of discourses, and discourses are inherent parts of all situations. Accounting 
for this does not reduce discourse to linguistic features, but implies a different 
conceptual and analytic move. The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse 
(SKAD) therefore addresses these challenges by inquiring into social relationships of 
knowledge and politics of knowledge. It is not interested in discourse as a linguistic 
                                        
18 Of course this is different when you simply act as political activist. 
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phenomenon or language game, but in discourse as process and structuration of 
knowledge production, circulation and transformation, including establishing ‘facts’ 
and ‘norms’. Such processes operate not only in the fields of science and technology 
studies, but everywhere in society, in religion as well as in politics, for example, and 
most of all transversally across such fields.  
SKAD (Keller 2011a, b., 2012b, 2013; Keller & Ulrich, 2014)19 is interested, to use 
the old words, in the social and the here and now: discursive constructions of reality. 
Close to Foucault, but integrating Berger and Luckmann (1966) and interpretive 
sociology as established by the pragmatist tradition, it takes up Ulrich Beck’s notion 
of “relationships of definition” (Beck, 2008, pp. 24-46). Beck proposed these in close 
affinity to Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’s concept of “relationship of production” or 
“relationship of domination”. Thus, relationships of knowledge refers to how our 
societies establish hierarchies of knowledge, belief, ideologies, technical norms, 
social values, etc. in their attempts at ordering and organizing the world. Politics of 
knowledge refers to the processes of establishing, objectifying, evaluating and 
transforming realities, e.g. via religions, political ideology and the sciences. 
5.4. The seriousness of (discourse) research as experimentation 
In interpretative analytics, reconstruction is not a simple representation of how things 
went on. Reconstruction is a process of theoretically informed empirical inquiry in the 
pragmatist sense. It is not a theorism which applies pre-established categories on 
empirical data, a procedure classifying data as proof of theory. Instead it takes 
seriously the capacity of empirical work and data to challenge thinking and to allow or 
even make us create new concepts to tell new stories. For example, much work in 
                                        
19 For more extended presentation of SKAD’s theoretical background, concepts and analytical 
procedures please refer to the references given. 
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governmentality studies ends up by simply identifying ‘neoliberal governmentality’ 
and ‘biopolitics’ or ‘biopower’. This is neither analysis nor explanation, but 
classification into established categories, which does not cause any surprise. In a 
recent critique of some work referring to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, cultural 
theorist Lawrence Grossberg made the very same argument: 
Such efforts to diagnose contemporary power appear to be driven by the 
theoretical concepts. The concepts are not treated as tools and are no longer 
open to the challenge of a revitalized empiricism. Instead, the world is reduced 
to the concepts themselves, without the necessary complexities that define the 
concreteness of any context. Empirical realities do make their appearance, but 
their promise is almost always guaranteed in advance. The demands of theory 
overpower the demands on theory. (...) As a result, one inevitably finds what 
one looks for. (Grossberg, 2014 p.13) 
Foucault worked in a rather different way in order to create new concepts via 
empirical work. As he said in an interview (Foucault 2000b), he lives through 
research as experimentation where you don’t always already know what you will see 
and get – the interest lies in changing one’s own thinking about the ways things are. 
To me, this is today’s challenge to the sociological imagination C. Wright Mills (2000 
[1959]) argued for so intensely. 
Therefore, discourse research needs tools (concepts, methodology), but not a pre-
established theory of discourse. And it needs good questions, questions that 
matter.20 
 
                                        
20 Remember Foucault’s interest in modern subjectivity and its historical production. 
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6. In guise of conclusion: questions that matter 
As this article has argued, the arguments and solutions presented by Latour and 
Boltanski against critique and for replacing critique have their particular shortcomings 
and limits. But replying to them by simply returning to a ‘critical stance’ and 
completely ignoring what they point to does not seem to respond to the challenges 
for a new critical inquiry today. Rather I would state that contemporary analysis in 
discourse research has to engage with the complexities of constellations inherent in 
discursive constructions of reality, in order to work against ever ongoing simplification 
(see Clarke & Keller 2014). This needs an ethos of experimentation in the sense of 
Foucault, of being attentive to different kinds of data, abductive reasoning and the 
creation of new views on social phenomena and “matters of fact”. It implies 
interpretative analytics, concepts and tools for analyzing social relationships and 
politics of power/knowledge, and carefully done reconstructive research – in order to 
prepare grounds for the possibility of emerging critique, which in its real unfolding is 
beyond the control of the social sciences. Such a sociological discourse research, as 
‘critical inquiry without the label’, could respond to what Paul Rabinow and Anthony 
Stavrianakis (2013), following Max Weber, called the “demands of the day”.  
So what are the good questions and issues today? Where is the complex analytical 
work of de-objectifying against simplification needed most? It is surely not this 
paper’s task to give that kind of advice. But in the guise of concluding at least two 
paths for such an inquiry into the discursive construction of reality and its politics of 
knowledge should be suggested. 
First, discourse research conceived of as sociology of knowledge in the very broad 
sense of combining Berger & Luckmann and Foucault (that is beyond science & 
technology studies or Karl Mannheim’s standpoint theory), provides a powerful 
27 
 
heuristic for analyzing social relationships of knowledge and politics of knowledge 
across the different fields of society. Processes of simplification and reification of 
realities abound and are shaped by a hybrid mix of heterogeneous elements for 
establishing evidence (including scientific knowledge, everyday sayings, religious 
worldviews, political ideologies, cultural frames). Therefore a comprehensive work of 
de-objectifying such ‘evidences’ via precise empirical analysis of its discursive 
construction, its genealogy, contingency and effects is needed today as much as it 
ever was. 
Second, – and here Boltanski’s and Thevenot’s idea of economies of worth and 
situations or instances of ‘doing critique’ in social arenas reappears on stage – 
corresponding questions for a sociological and discourse-orientated inquiry into such 
instances of knowledge, fact and norm making and remaking could include: Where 
and how, on which topics, issues, and phenomena, by which actors and means is 
factual, moral or aesthetic critique performed, evaluated, denied, or enhanced? 
Under what conditions? With what kinds of material and symbolic resources? And 
effects? 
Paul Rabinow & Anthony Stavrianakis’ (2014), in their book on Designs on the 
Contemporary, argue for a research agenda complementary to genealogical 
Foucauldian work, which is interested in the current arenas and struggles of 
innovation, transformation and traditions of all kinds. One case in point they present 
is that of Salman Rushdie and the conflict around his fictional book the Satanic 
Verses from 1988, where publication bans, threats of death, condemnation and 
critique by postcolonial thinkers all worked together against the author. You may 
remember the recent New York PEN club discussion on Charlie Hebdo and the 
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conflict amongst writers in the summer of 2015.21 One might also identify such issues 
as cases in point in current conflicts on the right to speak and its restrictions. Such 
discursive events and practices can be considered points of entry into important 
realms of contemporary relationships of knowledge and politics of knowledge. 
Knowledge, considered in the broad definition given to it by Berger & Luckmann or 
Foucault: not that which is true in a positivist or foundational sense, but that which 
claims to refer to some existence. I am convinced there is no way that leads from 
discourse research into such conflicts and processes of critique to the critical 
standpoint Boltanski so desperately seeks and Latour so vehemently opposes. But 
telling good and new stories about such conflicts could be one contribution of 
discourse research to the widening of social repertoires of action – understood as 
another path toward critical inquiry, despite the missing word ‘critical’. Therefore 
choosing issues and questions that matter, and doing solid empirical work, might be 
a promising perspective for discourse research as sociology of knowledge with the 
possibility to enable social transformation. 
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